Around the world, investors, practitioners, regulators and policy makers seek to understand whether, when and why recently listed stocks, initial public offerings (IPOs) are delisted rather than continue trading (survive). Using data on 7,627 IPOs issued during 2000-2008 across 32 countries, we explore the impact of the legal system on IPO survival. We find that IPOs in countries with better investor protections remain listed for longer. This suggests that better legal systems increase the net benefits companies derive from staying listed. We also provide evidence that better legal systems increase the effectiveness of IPO certification by venture capitalists, underwriters and auditors.
Introduction
Around the world, investors, practitioners, regulators and policy makers seek to understand whether, when and why recently listed stocks are delisted. Yet, little is know to date on how delisting varies across countries and regions. This paper examines the impact of the legal system on delistings of initial public offerings (IPOs) across 32 countries around the world. Following the law and finance literature (e.g., LaPorta et al., 1997 LaPorta et al., , 1998 LaPorta et al., , 2006 Berkowitz et al., 2003) we focus on quality of the legal system as measured by the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, the absence of corruption, the risk of expropriation and of contract repudiation, and the extent of shareholder rights. The law and finance literature (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002) shows that a country's legal system affects whether companies go public. We argue that legal systems also determine whether companies stay public, and hence whether their stocks remain listed. Legal systems that protect minority shareholders and investors increase the effectiveness of contracts, reduce the (informational and agency) costs of external financing and improve company performance (e.g., LaPorta 2006; Berkowitz 2003) . It is reasonable to expect that this reduces the chances of delisting due to poor performance. By reducing the cost of external finance, better legal systems also increases the benefits to company insiders of being listed net of listing costs (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002) . Hence, we may expect that companies are less likely to opt for voluntary delisting in better legal systems. On the other hand, by facilitating creditor recourse, more efficient legal systems may speed up the delisting and liquidation of poorly performing companies. 1 The direction of the impact of the legal system on IPO survival is ultimately an empirical issue which our analysis aims to resolve.
Either explicitly through (de-)listing rules or implicitly through established practice, IPO markets require the certification of issues by repeated players in financial markets with reputational capital, including underwriters, venture capitalists (VCs), and auditors (Carter and Manaster 1990; Megginson and Weiss 1991) . Certification helps resolve asymmetric information and agency problems between issuers and investors through explicit and implicit contracts. For control and monitoring mechanisms such as certification to be effective, requires a legal system that effectively enforces contracts and enables monitors to impact the actions of company insiders and obtain redress from them (Doidge et al., 2013) . As a result, we may expect that certification by financial and other backers is likely to be strengthened by more efficient legal systems. Conversely, certification by reputable underwriters and other 'certifiers' relies on intermediaries' reputations to enforce implicit contracts rather than the enforcement of explicit contracts by the legal system. It may be an alternative (i.e., a substitute rather than a complement) to explicit contracting if it involves the use of nonverifiable information that is privately observed by the certifying intermediary. However, the threat of litigation by disgruntled investors also reinforces underwriters' incentives to avoid losing valuable reputation. A priori, legality may be either a substitute or a complement for certification, and our analysis aims to resolve this issue empirically.
Almost all prior research on IPO survival focuses on individual countries, in most cases on the U.S. (e.g., Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 1999, 2000) . 2 Some studies examine IPOs in the UK (Espenlaub et al., 2012) . 3 Vismara et al. (2012) provide evidence on survival across several European countries. The quality of the legal system could have a significant impact on IPO survivals or failures. Previous studies on country's legal condition find that cross-country differences in the legal framework affect corporate governance (LaPorta et al. 1998; Mitton 2002 ) and corporate valuation (LaPorta et al. 2002) . However, these studies do not investigate whether the survival profiles of the IPOs varies with the level 4 of legal system across countries. The survival of the IPO firms has implication for various stakeholders as outlined in section 2. To date not much is known whether the quality of the legal system have a positive/negative effect on IPO survival. Single-country (or singleregion) studies do not shed light on the impact of the legal system on IPO survival due to minimum variations of the legal conditions variables within a country. Our study contributes to the literature by investigating this impact using a sample of 7,627 IPOs issued during 2000-2008 across 32 countries. The results of our analysis show that better legal systems help
IPOs remain listed longer. We show that the quality of the legal system improves IPO survival directly (e.g., by reducing the contracting costs faced by listed firms), and also indirectly by increasing the positive impact on IPO survival of IPO certification by venturecapital backers, underwriters and auditors.
Our study also examines the impact of market conditions on IPO survival. As market conditions vary both across countries and over time, our cross-country analysis of market conditions extends single-country analyses of the impact of (time-series variations in) market conditions on IPO survival. Our analysis controls for a wide range of firm-and issue-specific variables that have been shown to impact IPO survival in single-country setting, and our findings are robust to a range of variations in research design.
Our results are of interest to stock markets, regulators and policy makers worldwide interested in promoting stock-market listings and improving the availability of external equity to companies. 4 Our results are also of interest to investors seeking to identify stocks suitable for long-term investments, particularly to investors planning to commit capital outside their home market.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 motivates and outlines our research questions in the context of the conceptual framework and relevant literature.
Section 3 discusses our sample and methodology. Section 4 reports our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Conceptual Framework and Literature

Legality and IPO survival
The 'survival' of IPOs, that is, the continued trading of newly listed stocks on the stock market, matters not just to companies, their investors and stakeholders, but more widely to practitioners, policy maker, regulators and even to stock markets themselves. Survival is typically a consequence of good firm performance. As a result, it has been proposed as a proxy for firm performance (e.g., Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005; Espenlaub et al., 2012 ) and complements return-based measures of post-IPO performance that are often difficult to quantify, suggesting that an appropriate measure of performance for IPO firms is their ability to survive over time (Gerakos et al., 2013) . Companies, investors and policymakers are interested in IPO survival because as long as a stock remains listed, the issuing company can raise external funding from public markets. This has implications for its cost of external capital and real investment decisions, which in turn benefit other stakeholders including employees. Legal system that are more effective in reducing the information and agency costs of external equity increase company value (performance) and the net benefits of being listed. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show theoretically how the legal system of a country affects the costs and benefits that founder-owners derive from going public. Controlling shareholders of IPO companies are less likely to extract private benefits from minority shareholders in countries with more efficient judicial systems that are characterized by the rule of law, stronger shareholder rights, and where there is less chance of corruption, expropriation and contract repudiation. By reducing the private benefits of controlling shareholders who can extract at the expense of minority shareholders, better legal systems increase the value of IPOs to investors. For a given listing cost, more effective legal systems 6 increase the net benefits founder-owners derive from listing their companies. Doidge et al.
(2013) find empirical support for the prediction that more effective legal institutions increase IPO activity both in terms of numbers and proceeds of IPOs. Their study builds on the previous law and finance literature that demonstrates the impact of legal institutions on IPO activity and on economic and financial development more generally (LaPorta et al., 1997 (LaPorta et al., , 1998 (LaPorta et al., , 2006 Berkowitz et al., 2003) . LaPorta et al., (1997 LaPorta et al., ( , 1998 find that countries with stronger investor ('anti-director') rights and tighter securities laws have higher numbers of IPOs per capita. Djankov et al. (2008) finds that the ratio of equity issued in IPOs (relative to GDP) is positively correlated with how effectively legal systems restrict insiders' 'selfdealing' transactions. The law and finance literature based on LaPorta et al. (1997 LaPorta et al. ( , 1998 shows that legal institutions and rules influence other corporate decisions (capital structure, payout policy, VC contracting and corporate behaviour) and financial performance (Berkowitz, 2003; Cumming et al., 2006; Cumming et al., 2010) .
In sum, the existing literature shows that the legal system increases the likelihood that firms choose to go public. However, the impact of the legal system on how long companies stay listed remains unexplored. Following the reasoning of Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) , it is reasonable to expect that, once listed, companies continue to derive higher net benefits of remaining listed in countries with more effective legal systems. The law and finance literature shows theoretically and empirically that better legal systems improve company performance.
Higher company performance in turn reduces the chances of involuntary delisting and
liquidation. An important benefit of listing is access to external equity finance. By reducing the information and agency costs of external equity (e.g., by reducing controlling shareholder consumption of private benefits), better legal systems increase the net benefits to companies and their owners not just from becoming listed, but from being listed. That is, better legal 7 systems increase the net benefits of keeping companies listed post-IPO. This leads us to predict that better legal systems reduce the incidence of voluntary delisting.
However, in the case of underperforming companies, an efficient legal system should help to speed up delisting and liquidation to protect investors (including creditors') interests.
Extending the 'life' of an underperforming IPO is clearly suboptimal. During normal market conditions, this optimal-termination effect may affect only a small fraction of poorly performing stocks and the positive effect of the legal system on the contracting and performance of healthy stocks is likely to predominate in most circumstances. However, the direction of the impact of the legal system on IPO survival is ultimately an empirical issue which our analysis aims to resolve.
Our paper is related to the limited literature on the impact of regulation on IPO delisting (Simon, 1989; Engel et al., 2007; Burhop et al., 2014; Cattaneo et al., 2015) . 5 Simon (1989) examines failure rates of U.S. IPOs before and after the 1933 Securities Act and finds a reduction in failure rates after the introduction of the Act. Engel et al. (2007) examine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on delistings from U.S. stock markets, and find evidence that the increased cost of compliance due to the Act reduced the benefit of being listed and caused some firms to delist. Burhop et al. (2014) compare the survival of IPOs on the Berlin and London stock markets in the decade prior to World War I. They find that London IPOs perform (and survive) equally well as Berlin IPOs despite less stringent regulation in London.
Their study highlights the difficulty of comparing the impact of regulation across (a small number of) stock markets adopting alternative approaches to regulation. Cattaneo et al. (2015) examine the impact of changes in regulation on IPO survival in a single country (Italy) over an extensive (150-year) sample period. They find that improvements in investor protection over time increase IPO survival. In-depth studies of individual countries over long 8 periods complement cross-country studies, but it is difficult to adequately control for the impact of contemporaneous variations in unobservable (or unobserved) variables in studies of single or small numbers of countries.
To date, there is no cross-country study investigating the impact of the legal system on IPO survival. This study aims to fill this gap by studying the impact of the legal system on IPO survival using a substantial sample of IPOs that went public during 2000-2008 in one of 32 countries across the world. We measure the quality of the legal system using the legality index of Berkowitz et al. (2003) . Based on the work of LaPorta et al. (1997 , 1998 ), Berkowitz et al. (2003 construct this index as a weighted sum of the separate LaPorta et al. (1997 LaPorta et al. ( , 1998 indicators on the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, absence of corruption, (absence of) risk of expropriation and contract repudiation. 6 A higher legality index reflects a stronger legal system with better investor protection. Following previous studies (Cumming et al., 2007 (Cumming et al., , 2010 , we use the legality index to overcome the issue of high correlations among the separate LaPorta et al. (1997 LaPorta et al. ( , 1998 factors.
In addition to the legality index, we also include a separate indicator of the origin of a country's legal systems being Common Law as opposed to Civil Law. Common Law systems are of English origin, while civil law systems have French, German or Scandinavian origins.
Previous findings show that English common law systems typically provide more rights to (minority) investor and better protection and enforcement of their rights (LaPorta et al., 1997 (LaPorta et al., , 1998 Cumming et al., 2010) . In addition to the direct (country-wide) effect of the legal system on IPO survival, we expect that the legal system also has an indirect effect by interacting with other control mechanisms within each country. On the other hand, certification by reputable underwriters and other 'certifiers' relies on intermediaries' reputation to enforce implicit contracts rather than the enforcement of explicit contracts by the legal system. Certifying backers and intermediaries often privately observe information about the issuing firm that is non-verifiable by third parties (such as courts). Consequently, certification may be independent of, or be used as a substitute for, explicit contracting. A priori, the interaction effect between the legal system and certification may be either positive (if the two control mechanisms are complements), negative (if they are substitutes), or zero (if they are unrelated). Our analysis aims to resolve the issue empirically.
Existing single-country studies do not shed light on the impact of legality on the relation between IPO survival and certification, i.e., the indirect effect of legality on IPO survival through its interaction with certification. Our study is the first to examine this important issue. While the direct effect of legality helps explain the variation in IPO survival across countries (but not within countries), a significant interaction effect between legality and certification explains the variation in IPO survival within a given country.
IPO Market Conditions
Our survival analysis also examines the impact that conditions (returns) in a country's IPO market at the time of the IPO have on the survival of the IPO. Evidence from singlecountry studies suggests that the initial returns of other recent issues prior to an IPO, reflecting the 'hotness' of the IPO market, impact IPO survival. Previous U.S. studies find that IPOs issued during hot markets to have shorter times to delisting (Demers and Joos 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2010) and characterised by high initial IPO returns volatility (Lowry et al., 2010) . Our analysis examines the impact of market activity using the hot-issue measure of Demers and Joos (2007) , namely the country-specific average initial returns of IPOs issued during the three months prior to the month of the IPO. While the U.S. IPO market is characterised by dramatic ups and downs in IPO volumes over time, other markets (e.g., in
Europe and Asia) have been shown to be less cyclical (Vismara et al., 2012; Espenlaub et al., 2015) . Our analysis sheds light on whether the impact of market 'hotness' on survival is also found in more stable IPO markets. While single-country studies are limited to examining how variations in hotness over time affect IPO survival, our cross-country analysis allows us to examine the impact of both time-series as well as cross-country variations in hotness. That is, we examine whether IPOs issued in countries (and during period) with hot IPO markets have shorter (or longer) times to delisting.
Control Variables
Our analysis controls for the effects of a wide range of variables that have been shown to impact IPO survival in single-country studies. These include firm listing time characteristics, specifically firm size, profitability, sales, trading record (age), insider ownership, market-to-book ratio, leverage, cash holdings, growth of total assets and industry.
We also control for issue characteristics including IPO initial returns and issue year.
Existing evidence from single-country studies suggests these control variables significantly impact IPO survival. 8 Hensler et al. (1997) report that IPO survival is positively related to firm age, size, initial IPO returns and insider ownership (suggesting a negative impact of public float on survival). Jain and Kini (1999) find that firm size and profitability (pre-IPO operating performance) are positively related to IPO survival. Kooli and Meknassi (2007) confirm the positive impact of firm size. Market-to-book ratio (measuring growth opportunities) and asset growth may be expected to increase long-term earnings and hence the chances of firm survival. On the other hand, Fama and French (2004) find that highgrowth stocks in the U.S. tend to have lower survival rates. Similarly, higher cash holdings and lower leverage may auger well for the long-term financial stability of the firm. On the other hand, they may also be the cause of company failure if they give rise to agency costs of equity due to the lack of financial discipline allowing self-interested managers to waste company funds. Inside ownership, i.e., the proportion of shares held by insiders is essentially the opposite of 'public float' which can be defined as (1 -insider ownership). Hence, there is potentially a trade-off between a positive impact of public float on IPO survival through increased stock liquidity allowing more efficient trading, and a negative agency effect through the dispersion of share ownership. As all past evidence is based on single-country studies, we have no a priori expectations on the impact of the control variables on IPO survival across our sample of 32 countries. Our approach of including both country-and firm-specific variables is consistent with previous cross-country studies (e.g. Engelen and
Essen 2008 , 2010 : Boulton et al 2010 Espenlaub et al. 2015) .
Data and Methodology
Our initial We also exclude cross-listed firms and ADRs as they are likely to be affected by the regulatory and legal requirements of more than one country. Next we collect the firm-level IPO-date financial data for these newly listed IPO firms from SDC Platinum New Issue database, Worldscope and Datastream. For an observation to be included in our final sample, we require both accounting data (total assets, earnings, sales, and debt level) and market data (first-day returns and market capitalization at the time of listing) to be available for the newly 13 listed firms. After imposing these restrictions, we are left with the final 'full' sample of 7,627
IPOs across 32 countries listed during 2000 to 2008. 9 For our analysis of the impact of certification on IPO survival, we require data on VC backing, underwriter and auditor identity (and reputation). We collect these data from IPO prospectuses from SDC. We also collect data on two further control variables: insider ownership and firm age. We collect ownership from IPO prospectuses and the founding and incorporation dates of firms (to calculate firm age) from Worldscope and the Amadeus Osiris database. These additional data requirements reduce our sample to 4,755 observations across 32 countries. To check if our reduced sample is representative of our larger, initial sample, we conduct a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of distributions. The null hypothesis of equality of the distributions cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. Descriptive statistics for both samples are given in Appendix A4.
To eliminate the impact of outliers, we trim firm-level variables, namely the initial return, and earnings at the upper and lower one-percent level. We winsorize size, cash holding, debt level, market to book, sales, and ownership concentration only at the upper onepercent level since they have a lower bound value of zero. Since it is an international study, winsorization is undertaken at the country-level.
We track each IPO firm in our sample until March 2015 to determine whether and when the stock is delisted from the stock market. We use stock-market lists of the listed stocks in each stock-market to identify whether a stock is delisted, and Datastream to identify when it is delisted. We define survivors as stocks that continue to trade on the stock market on which they initially list, or transfer to another stock market. Non-survivors (also referred to as 'failures' or 'deaths') are stocks that are delisted from the stock market for any reason other than moving to other stock market or being taken over by another firm. If a firm is delisted as a result of being the target of a merger or acquisition (M&A), we classify it as a censored survivor unless the target firm is in financial distress at the time of the acquisition.
In our sample of 7,627 IPOs, 754 firms delist due to M&A. Of these, 606 firms are merged or acquired while in financial distress and are thus classified as non-survivors; 10 the remaining 148 stocks are classified as censored survivors. In appendix A6, we also check whether our results are robust to alternative definitions of survival (specifically, treating all M&As as failures).
The survival rates of IPOs are estimated non-parametrically using the Kaplan-Meier method based on the following expression:
where S(t j ) is the estimated survival function in year t j measuring the probability of survival beyond t j conditional on the IPO being listed at least until year t j . n i is the number of the IPOs that are listed in a given regional subsample (or for the pooled sample) at the start of year t j , also known as the risk set at t j . d j is the number of the IPOs delisted during year t j .  is equal to one if there is a failure, and zero otherwise. Alternatively, EQ. 1 can be restated as EQ. 2 to express the survival function in year t j as the probability of survival in year t j conditional on the stock being listed at least up to year t j times the survival function of the previous year t j-1 . 
where Ln(T j ) is the natural logarithm of the survival time or time to failure, X i denotes an independent variable ('covariate') i with coefficient β i . In the AFT model, exp∑β i X i is an acceleration factor. The effect of the covariates is to extend or shrink the length of survival time by a constant relative amount exp∑β i X i . If exp∑β i X i > 1 survival time is increased, and if exp∑β i X i < 1 survival time is decreased (Bradburn et al., 2003) .
We measure the marginal effect of an individual explanatory variable in the AFT model using its 'time ratio'. The time ratio is calculated as the exponential of the estimated coefficient of a variable (Bradburn et al., 2003; Espenlaub et al., 2012) . A positive coefficient implies a time ratio above one, indicating that an increase in the covariate increases the survival time. More specifically, the time ratio measures the extent to which changes in the independent variables speed up or slow down the occurrence of delisting. Given a one-unit increase in the independent variable, survival time increases by a multiple equal to the time 16 ratio. As AFT is a parametric model, it is necessary to specify the distribution of the baseline survival function. We use the likelihood ratio or Wald test to determine the appropriate distribution in case of nested models, such as comparing the Weibull against the exponential distribution, or the gamma against the Weibull or log-normal distributions. The AIC is the appropriate test to choose the best-fitting model in the case of a non-nested model between the log-logistic and the log-normal distribution. The AIC is defined as:
where L is the maximized value of the likelihood function, k is the number of model covariates and c is the number of model-specific distributional parameters. Either of the lognormal or log-logistic models has two distributional parameters i.e. c=2. The AIC test shows that log-normal distribution has lower AIC value than the log-logistic model, and hence we select the log-normal distribution.
For robustness check and comparative purposes, we also estimate the Cox ( than one and indicates that an increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the failure rate. In comparing the results of the AFT and Cox (1972) models, we expect that a given independent variable with a positive sign and a time ratio above one in the AFT model will have a negative coefficient and a hazard ratio of less than one in the Cox (1972) model (due to the structural differences between the two models).
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The main variables of interest included in our analysis of IPO survival below are the legality index (Berkowitz et al., 2003) and three interaction terms of legality with each one of three measures of certification: venture-capital backing, underwriter reputation and auditor reputation. As a further indicator of the legal system, we include an indicator that the country's legal origin is Common Law (as opposed to Civil Law). We also include measures of return conditions in the IPO market (Hot Issue) and stock market (Market_return). Finally, we control for a broad range of firm and issue characteristics. Appendix A1 summarises the definitions and sources of our variables. 
Empirical findings
Descriptive statistics
Multivariate analysis
To assess the direct and indirect impact of legality on IPO survival, we estimate an [Please insert Table 2 (Manigart et al., 2002; Vismara et al., 2012) .
We find comparatively less evidence for IPO certification by auditors. Auditor reputation appears to have no significant impact on IPO survival across the pooled sample in Table 3 (although the variable does become significant at 10 percent in Table 4 below). In Table 3 , Auditor Reputation is statistically significant at the 10 percent level only for IPOs in North America and among the BRICS countries. In economic terms, the effect is small in North America (with reputable auditors increasing IPO survival times by just 3 percent). In BRICS countries, by contrast, reputable auditors increase survival times by circa 30 percent.
[Please insert table 3 about here]
Based on our findings on the separate impacts on IPO survival of the legal system and of certification (in Tables 2 and 3) , we next examine the interaction effect between the legal system and certification by VC backers, underwriters and auditors. Table 4 Table 4 ). The time ratios on High Legality range from 2.02 to almost 2.6 indicating that IPOs in countries with legal systems of above-median quality have between two to 2.6 times longer survival times than IPOs in other countries.
[Please insert table 4 about here]
Robustness Checks
We test the robustness of our results using a number of variations to our research design. To examine whether our results are sensitive to the distributional assumptions made in using the AFT model, we re-estimate the model in Table 4 using the non-parametric Cox (1972) model. We find our results are qualitatively unchanged. The results of Cox (1972) models estimated using the pooled sample of all 32 countries is shown in Appendix A5. In interpreting the results, it needs to be borne in mind that a variable with a positive impact on survival time (i.e., a positive coefficient in the AFT model) will have a negative impact on the hazard of delisting (i.e. a negative coefficient in the Cox (1972) model).
Our approach to classifying M&A delistings in the analysis presented in Tables 1-4 above classifies M&A delistings of poorly performing companies as failures because for investors such M&As are likely to involve similar wealth effects as delistings for negative reasons (such as liquidation). The approach in our analysis above treats M&As of well-26 performing companies as censored survivors because such delistings are likely to imply lower or no losses to investors and other interested parties. Alternately, it may be argued that all delistings are negative news, and should be classified as failures. Also, our earlier approach relies on a reasonably accurate measurement of the pre-M&A target company performance.
Following previous studies we examine the robustness of our results to alternative treatments of M&A delistings (Howton, 2006; Espenlaub et al., 2012) . Specifically, we re-classify all M&A delistings irrespective of firm performance as failures (non-survivors). Using this approach, as reported in Appendix A6, we find that all our results on the impact of legality, certification and IPO market conditions remain qualitatively unchanged.
Conclusion
Around the world, investors, practitioners, regulators and policy makers seek to understand whether, when and why recently listed stocks are delisted rather than continue trading. Based on the theoretical developments and empirical findings of the law and finance literature, we argue that legal systems that effectively protect investors' interests, enforce contracts and control the information and agency costs of external financing, not only encourage companies to list their stocks (as shown in previous studies) but also ensure that IPO companies are able and willing to stay listed. Table 2 : Results for the AFT model using the logarithm of the survival time as a dependent variable and set of IPO characteristics, quality of the legal system and market conditions as explanatory and control variables. IPO firms are classified as survivors if they continue to trade on the stock market or move to a different market. M&A delistings of well-performing companies are classified as censored survivors if they rank above median based on all of the following three company performance measures in the year prior to the M&A delisting: cash to total assets, total liability to total asset and operating income to total asset. The results are reported for the pooled sample of all 32 countries together, and separately for each of the four regions: North America, Europe, BRICS, and Asia-Pacific. We control for year and industry fixed effects, and robust standard errors are clustered by country. For the detailed definition and construction of the variables, please refer to the Appendix A1. We report the coefficients and the time ratios (TR). ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Results of the AFT model using the subsample of IPO firms with data available for the certification measures (VC backing, underwriter and auditor reputation). IPO firms are classified as survivors if they continue to trade on stock market or moved to a different market. M&A delistings of well-performing companies are classified as censored survivors if they rank above median based on all of the following three company performance measures in the year prior to the M&A delisting: cash to total assets, total liability to total asset and operating income to total asset. The results are reported for all the pooled sample (of all 32 countries together), and separately for North America, Europe, BRICS and Asia-Pacific. We control for year and industry fixed effects, and robust standard errors are clustered by country. For the detailed definition and construction of the variables, please refer to Appendix A1. We report the coefficients and the time ratios (TR). ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Appendix A5: Results of a Cox (1972) model using the smaller sample of IPO firms with available data on age, insider ownership (i.e., 1 -public float), cash to total asset, VC backing, underwriter and auditor reputation. IPO firms are classified as censored if they continue to trade on stock market or moved to a different market. M&A delistings of well-performing companies are classified as censored if they rank above median based on all of the following three company performance measures in the year prior to the M&A delisting: cash to total assets, total liability to total asset and operating income to total asset. The results are reported for the pooled sample, followed by North America, Europe, BRICS and Asia-Pacific. We control for year and industry fixed effects, and robust standard errors are clustered by country. For the detailed definition and construction of the variables, please refer to Appendix A1. We report coefficients and hazard ratios (HR). ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables
